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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD IN PENNSYLVANIA WILLS*
By

A. J. White Hutton"
Presumptions.
It has been noted, heretofore, that various presumptions are invoked in matters
of testamentary capacity and undue influence. Sometimes these presumptions are
designated as of law or at other times of fact and still again of mixed law and fact.
A presumption is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence
of some other fact founded upon a previous experience of their connection or
dictated by the policy of law. 85
All of the presumptions discussed in the two issues outlined are presumptions
of fact and of course rebuttable.
In the older cases the expressions in the opinions are not very helpful in distinguishing presumptions of law from those of fact, but in recent years our courts
have been endeavoring to clarify the matter by some very pertinent observations. In
Watkins v. PrudentialInsurance Company,88 Maxey, J. observed:
"Considerable confusion appears in judicial opinions as to the nature
of presumptions and their function in the administration of justice. They
are not evidence and should not be substituted for evidence. Presumptions
are generally grouped into two major classes: (1) Of law; and (2) Of
fact. The former usually have the force of legal maxims and become rules
of law, with definite procedural consequences. As Mr. Justice Agnew said
in Tanner v. Hughes and Kincaid, 53 Pa. 289: 'A legal presumption is the
conclusion of law itself of the existence of one fact from others in proof,
and is binding on the jury, prima facie till disproved, or conclusively, just
as the law adopts the one or the other as the effect of proof.' Justice Agnew
also refers to the other kind of presumption as merely 'a natural probability', i.e., 'an inference of -fact of the probability.'"
In Geho's Estate,87 applying the learning to a will case, Maxey, J., further observed:
"Proof of the fact of the probate of a will does not upon an appeal from
the probate have any evidential value, except as stated in Szmahl's Es*This is the conclusion of Prof. Hutton's article on this subject, the first portion having been
published in the June, 1948, issue, 52 Dirk. L. Rev. 225, and being part of the Revised Edition of
HUTTON ON W:LLS to be, published. All rights reserved by the author.
**A.B., Gettysburg College, 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; LL.B., Harvard University, 1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1902--; Member of Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, 1931-1935; Author of HUTTON ON WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA,
Member of the Pennsylvania and Franklin County Bar. Associations.
86 See Century Dictionary.
86 315 Pa. 497 (1934) 173 A. 644.

87 340 Pa. 412 (1941) 17 A.2d. 342.
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tate,,8 but it does have procedural value, for itraises a presumption of the
will's validity and this presumption becomes a challenge for proof addressed to the challenger of the will. We said in Watkins v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644, 95 A.L.R. 869: 'Presumptions *
are not evidence (315 Pa. page 500, 173 A. page 646, 95 A.L.R. 869).
*0* "They are not fact suppliers; they are guideposts indicating whence
proof must come (315 Pa. page 504, 173 A. page 648, 95 A.L.R. 869).' "
The following presumptions important for procedural value are collated from
the cases heretofore discussed under the topics, Testamentary Capacity and Undue'
Jnfluence:
(1) The law presumes the competency of a testator and that the instrument
propounded expresses his free and unconstrained wishes in regard to the disposition of his property. Consequently, the will having been proved in either form
already discussed, 89 the burden of coming forward with evidence and dislodging
the prima facie case isupon the contestants and they must show the contrary by a
preponderance of evidence. 90
(2) The will having been proved inthe forms already discussed there isa
presumption that the testator knew the contents of the will as executed by him and
the burden is upon contestants to show the contrary.9 1
(3) In cases of marital relationship, the will having been proved in the forms
already discussed the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity and the
absence of undue influence.9 2
(4) In cases of filial relationship the will having been proved in the forms
already discussed the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity and the
absence of undue influence.99
(5) Where a stranger has actively participated in the preparation and execution of a will in which he is a substantial beneficiary the presumption arises of lack
of testamentary capacity and undue influence and the burden of dislodging the same
9
is imposed upon the proponent. '
(6) A meretricious relationship as shown of itself raises no presumption of
undue influence and consequently the will having been proved in the forms already
335 Pa. 89 (1939) 6 A. 2d. 267.
89' See ante, Testamentary Capacity-Burden of Proof.
90 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375 (1854); Pusey's Est., 321 Pa. 248 (1936) 184 A.
844; Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 904.
91 Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218 (1865); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. 401 (1869); Frew v.
Clark, 80 Pa. 170 (1875).
92 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375 (1854) ; Spence's Est., 258 Pa. 542 (.1917) 102 A.
212; Cookson's Est., 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 904.
98 Hook's Est., 207 Pa. 203 (1903) 56 A. 428; Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. 400 (1902) 53
A. 253.
94 Blume v. Hartman, 115 Pa. 32 (1886) 8 A. 219; Caldwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199 (1883);
Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 208 Pa. 444 (1904) 57 A. 821, per Endlich, J.,"No case has gone so
far as to overthrow a will duly executed, when it was shown that the party executing it was of sound
mind and clearly understood its contents, though it was drawn by the person taking the estate. Ash's
88

Est., 351 Pa. 317 (1945) 41 A. 2d. 620.
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discussed the presumption arises in favor of testamentary capacity and the absence
of undue influence.' 5
(7) Where a confidential relationship is maintained and the confidant has
actively participated in the preparation and execution of a will in which he is a substantial beneficiary the presumption arises of lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence and the burden of dislodging the same is imposed upon the proponent.'6
(8) If the will was not written or procured to be written by the confidential
advisor who benefits, nevertheless, the presumption of lack of testamentary capacity
and undue influence arises if the physical or mental condition of the testator is
shown at the time of the will making to have been perceptibly weakened.07
(9) It may be stated as a general proposition that in any case where proof is
submitted by contestants of a will showing extreme infirmity or mental weakness
upon the part of the testator, a presumption arises of lack of testamentary capacity
and undue influence which must be met by the proponents.' 8
Undue Influence
What is undue influence? An answer to this question is given by Sir J. P.
Wilde in Hall v. Hall" wherein he states:
"Pressure of whatever character whether acting on the fears or the
hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the
iudgment, is a species of restraint under which no valid will can be made.
Importunity or threats, such as the testator has not the courage to resist,
moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet,
or of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort, these, if carried
to. a degree in which the free play of the testator's judgment, discretion
or wishes, is overborne, will constitute undue influence, though no force
is either used or threatened. In a word, a testator may be led but not driven
and his will must be the offspring of his own volition, and not the record
of some one else's."
The emphasis in the above quotation has been supplied by the present writer
but it is deemed to be in accordance with our cases.
The word "undue" as pointed out by Judge Endlich in Caughey v. Bridenbaug' 00 is not used in a popular sense but as he explains:
95 Main v. Ryder, 83 Pa. 217 (1877); Wertheimer's Estate, 286 Pa. 155 (1927) 133 A. 144;
Weber v. Kline, 293 Pa. 85 (1928) 141 Pa. 721; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
320 Pa. 161 (1935) 181 A. 594.
96 Yardley v. Cuthbertson. 108 Pa. 395 (1885) 1 A. 765; Null's Estate, 302 Pa. 64 (1930)
153 A. 137; Wetzel v. Edwards, 340 Pa. 121 (1940) 16 A. 2d. 441; In re Stewart's Est., 354 Pa.
288 (1946) 47 A. 2d. 204.
97 Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58 (1926) 132 A. 786.
98 Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457; Gongaware v. Donehoo, 255 Pa. 502 (1917)
100 A. 264; Llewellyn's Est., 296 Pa. 74 (1929) 146 A. 810; Buhan v. Keslar, 328 Pa. 312 (1937)
194 A. 917. Conversely, evidence of strong and free mind Qf testator requires clear and convincing

proof of fraud or coercion. Fink's Estate, 310 Pa. 453 (1933) 165 A. 832; In re Dichter's Est., 354
Pa. 444 (1946) 47 A. 2d. 691.
99 'L.R. 1 P. &D. 481.
100 208 Pa. 414 (1904) 57 A, 821.
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"As a legal phrase, it is used in a stricter sense as denoting something
wrong according to a standard of morals which the law enforces in the
relations of men, and therefore something legally wrong, something violative of a legal duty-in a word something illegal."
Continuing, the learned judge further explains:
"And again the word 'influence' does not refer to any and every line of
conduct capable of disposing in one's favor a free and self-directing mind,
but to a control acquired over another which virtually destroys his free
agency.
In Phillips' Estate101 Moschzisker, C.J. in a statement since repeatedly approved l02 thus sums up the matter:
"In order to constitute undue influence sufficient to void a will, there
must be imprisonment of the body or mind .... fraud, or threats, or misrepresentations, or circumvention, or inordinate flattery, or physical or
moral coercion, to such a degree as to prejudice the mind of the testator,
to destroy his free agency and to operate as a present restraint upon him
in the making of the will."
In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman'03 Woodward, J. in a well considered case
thus cautioned:
"What constitutes undue influence, is a question which must depend
very much on the circumstances of each case. It is in its nature one of those
irquiries which cannot be referred to any general rule. Yet many principles have been settled by judicial decision which, properly applied, afford
in most cases an adequate guide to a right decision of the question."
In Perret v. Perret'0 4 is an illustration of such pressure exerted by the wife at
the time of execution as to overpower the volition of the testator husband without
convincing his judgment and in which his discretion or wishes were overborne by
the threat of the wife to put him out of the house if he did not comply with her
demands. He was ill and weak at the time and died of senility five days thereafter.
On the other hand in Mortiz v. Broughol although the conduct of the wife
towards the husband testator was domineering, overbearing and unseemly yet it did
not appear to be connected with the act of execution as in Perret v. Perret,"'6 and
furthermore the will remained undisturbed by the testator for seven years, during
which time he had ample opportunity to make another will. Likewise in Tawney v.
Long'0 7 although there were importunities testified to as "dingdonging" and from
which a delicate mind might shrink, they were declared insufficient to constitute
undue influence. However, it is conceivable that such a course of conduct deliberately
101 244 Pa, 35 (1914) 90 A. 457.
102 Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58 (1926)
133 A. 144.
101 23 Pa. 375 (1854)
104 184 Pa. 131 (1897) 39 A. 33.
105 16 S.& R. 403 (1827)
106 See note 104 supra.
107 76 Pa. 106 (1874)

132 A. 786; Wertheimer's Est.. 286 Pa..155 (1926)
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and persistently practiced upon a person weak in body and mind, causing distress
of mind or social discomfort until the free play of testator's judgment was overborne,

would constitute facts sufficient to justify a jury finding undue influence.
In Armor's Estate 0 8 is presented a typical set of facts where the confidential
advisor asserted such admitted moral command over an aged testatrix in the testamentary act that the same was the record of another's volition rather than the offspring of the mind and will of the testatrix.
Again in Robinson v. Robinson'0 9 is illustrated what the jury apparently determined was the yielding of the mother to the importunities of the son for the
sake of peace and quiet of an aged, weak woman escaping from distress of mind or
social discomfort by complying with the wishes of the son. In short the conduct of
the son passed from the category of coaxing to that of driving. Or did the jury
believe the son asserted moral command over his aged, doting and weak mother
while occupying a position as confidential advisor as in Armor's Estate?110
In Scattergood v. Kirk1"' there is an instance of a caretaker of a woman weak
in body and in mind and the court considered the situation as one of confidential
relationship. The facts of undue influence exerted at the time of the execution of
the will indicate a moral command asserted and yielded to by the testatrix, in other
words the complete domination by the confidante of the mind of the confider as
illustrated also in Armor's Estate.11 Central Trust Company v. Boyer 1 " is also a
case to be classified as one of moral command exerted over the testator and indicated, inter aliaby the unnatural and inofficious will made.
The above cases illustrate in a fairly comprehensive way just what is considered
by the courts as undue influence. It has been held repeatedly and is illustrated by
such cases as Trost v. Dingier,11" Englert v. Englert,118 and Tawney v. Long 118 that
solicitations however importunate cannot of themselves constitute undue influence,
for though these may have a constraining effect, they do not destroy the testator's
power to freely dispose of his estate. Likewise in Roberts v. Clemen! 117 friendly
offices and kind and considerate treatment will not be considered as undue influence.
There has been stated repeatedly and in fact is embraced in all of the definitions
of undue influence that inordinate flattery will be so considered. Rood in his work
on Wills' 18 traces this specification to the old work of Swinburne on Wills, but
states that he has not been able to find a decision refusing a will probate on the
108 154 Pa. 517 (1893) 26 A. 619.
109 203 Pa. 400 (1902) 53 A. 253.
110 Se note 108 supra.
111 192 Pa. 263 (1899) 43 A. 1030.
112 154 Pa. 517 (1893) 26 A. 619.
11 308 Pa.402 (1932) 162 A. 806.
114 118 Pa. 269 (1888) 12 A. 296.
115 198 Pa. 326 (1901) 47 A. 940.
110 76 Pa. 106 (1874).
117 202 Pa. 198 (1902) 51 A. 758.
118 Rood on Wills, 2nd Ed. Sec. 181.
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ground that the testator was induced to make it by inordinate flattery practiced with
the design of procuring the will, and no Pennsylvania case is recalled along this
19
line.'
Something should be said about the peculiar position of the undue influence
cases involving confidential relationship. In some of these cases 120 there has been
actual proof of the exertion of some kind of undue influence falling within the definition of Sir J. P. Wilde, but in others the issue has been granted or the will set aside
on the grounds that either the facts were such, essentially involving weakness of body
and mind, in the cases of granting issues, or in the trials the proponent was not able
to meet the burden of proof as imposed upon him on account of such weakness of
body or mind. In Hoopes' Estate' 2' the proponent could not overcome the fact that
the testator had been found generally insane. In Griffin's Estate122 there was likewise an adjudication of the testatrix as a weakminded person and the proponent
had the burden of overcoming the presumption of testamentary incapacity, and
under the facts the court felt impelled to grant an issue.
Likewise in Patti's Estate'" the same general situation prevailed and the court
felt impelled to grant the issue in order that the facts might be found by the jury.
In Yardley v. Cuthbertson"' it is interesting to note that the jury actually found
as a fact no undue influence, but did find that the testator at the time of the execution
of the codicil lacked testamentary capacity. In Schwartz's Estate12 5 the lower court
was affirmed in an opinion by Maxey, J., wherein the facts as developed showed
that the testatrix was exceedingly weak in body and in mind and although there was
no specific evidence of undue influence as exercised by the proponent, yet in her
capacity as a professional nurse having the care of the testatrix, she occupied a confidential relationship to her and the burden was therefore imposed upon the proponent owing to the weak physical and mental condition of the testatrix to show
affirmatively that no improper influence controlled the making of the will and that
the testatrix had a clear knowledge of her property and the effect of the testamentary
disposition. In contrast with this case, that of W'etzel v. Edwards,126 found in the
same volume of the report and the opinion by the same justice, may be studied. In
this latter case it was determined that no confidential relationship existed, consequently the tables were turned, so to speak, and the burden of establishing undue
influence was a part of the contestant's case which he was unable to meet.
119 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, supra, note 90, per Woodward, J.: "Threats and lattery, which
induce and coerce a testator to subscribe and execute the will, furnish sufficient ground for setting
it aside: Denslow v. Moore, .2Day 12."
120 Armor's Est., 154 Pa. 511 (1893) 26 A. 253; Scattergood v. Kirk, 192 Pa. 263 (1899) 43
A. 1030.
121 174 Pa. 373 (1896) 34 A. 603.
122 See supra note 46.
128 See supra note 47.
194 See supra note 75.
125 340 Pa. 170 i940) 16 A. 2d. 374.
126 340 Pa. 121 (1940) 16 A. 2d. 441. Cf. In Re Ash's Est., 351 Pa. 317 (1945) 41 A. 2d.
620, per Stearne, J., distinguishing In Re Schwartz's Est., supra.
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Although it has been stated that where a confidential relationship is maintained
and the confidant has actively participated in the preparation and execution of the
will, in which he is a substantial beneficiary, the presumption arises of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, and the burden of dislodging the same is
imposed upon the proponent, our late cases emphasize the physical and mental condition of the testator at the time of the execution of the will. In Caughey v. Bridenbemgh' 2 7 the testatrix was shown to have been in good health and possessed of a
very vigorous mind and therefore the explanation as made by the confidential advisor of his relationship with the testatrix was deemed sufficient along with other
evidence and the issue was refused. In Buhan v. Keslar,128 Schaffer, J., emphasized
that the burden of proof of undue influence rests upon the contestant and shifts
to a proponent who occupied a confidential relationship to the testatrix only where
there is evidence of weakened intellect.
Burden of Proof.
This topic, together with procedural matters incident, has been discussed in
the previous chapter. 129 What was said there will not be repeated here, except in
so far as the present discussion requires. The concept of Orphans' Court powers has
been of slow growth and it was not until the passage of the Orphans' Court Act
of 1832 and the decisions of the courts thereon that this court was recognized as one
of co-ordinate jurisdiction with decrees given full recognition by the courts of
law.' 80 The history of this development has been traced in interesting fashion by
Scott' s ' and Rhone. 182 In like manner matters of procedure and practice were slow
in their development with the courts of first instance using frequently different
methods lacking precision and uniformity, which probably has affected some appellate opinions if not decisions. In Wilson v. Gatson 88 the Supreme Court construed the Act of April 22, 1856184 as giving the probate of a will by the Register
such a finality that his judicial decree thereon could not be impeached collaterally
in an action of ejectment brought in the right of their heir at law to recover real
estate devised by the will. The effect of the act as construed was to make the probate
of a will devising real estate conclusive unless within the time specified an appeal
was taken and thus the law is today.18 5
However, some years before in Thompson v. Kyner'8 6 an, ejectment was maintained under similar facts without any comment by court or counsel. Likewise in
127 208 Pa. 414 (1904) 57 A. 821.

128 328 Pa. 312 (1934) 194 A. 917.
129 Chapter V, Topic: Burden of Proof and Record of Probate.

180 McPherson v. Cunliff, 11 S. & R. 422 (1824).
181 Scott on Intestate Law of Pennsylvania.
182 Rhone, Orphans' Court Practice in Pennsylvania.
18 92 Pa. 207 (1879).
184 Sec. 7, Act of Apr. -22, 1856, P.L. 533; see also present law, Sec. 16-Register of Wills
Act of 1917, P.L. 415, 20 PS 1886.
135 20 PS 1886; Fleming's Et., 265 Pa. 399 (1919) 109A. 265.
186 65 Pa. 368 (1870).
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Yardley v; Cuthbertron3 7 the proper placing of the parties in an issue devisavit
vel non was questioned by Green, J., and in Caug/ley v. Bridenbaugb'38 is an application of the theory of the learned justice in placing contestant as plaintiff and the
proponent as defendant. In expounding this theory Green, J.,139 thus maintained;
"The law presumes sanity and freedom from undue influence as to all
wills, and that presumption prevails until the contrary is alleged and
proven. He who makes such allegations must prove them, and therefore
the real burden of proof is on him. Strictly, therefore, he should be plaintiff in the issue. As the executors, as such, have no interest in the estate to
be distributed, they have no business in the issue and ought not to be
parties to it. The parties actually interested in sustaining the will ought to
be defendants in the issue. With the contestant as plaintiff and the legatees
as defendants and an issue to try specific disputed facts only, a properly
constituted litigation will be established by consistent in, an wit , itself,
conforming to the rules of pleading and evidence, in proper subservience
to the statute under sanction, and by force of which it is conducted, and in
all things satisfactory to the requirements of the legal and judicial mind.
These views, however, are obiter dicta only, the question is not distinctly
before us, and they are expressed because the occasion has suggested
them, and in order that the attention of the profession may be attracted to the subject. In some facts of the state the issues in will cases have
been framed and tried in the manner here suggested for many rears and
with entire satisfaction to the bench and bar as we understand.'
It has been held that the framing of the issue is wholly within the discretion
of the Orphans' Court and is not reviewable 40 but the long established practice in
Philadelphia County and now generally throughout the state is to make the proponents the plaintiffs. 141 Likewise in the preliminary hearing to determine whether
an issue should be granted, the proponent first goes forward. This practice is believed to be the better and in conformance with elementary principles in argumentation and debate that the affirmative goes forward first and essentially has the labormg oar, so the proponent has the affirmative, viz., the eventual establishment of
the will. The so-called presumptions, as explained by our courts, 142 are guideposts
indicating whence proof must come, viz., a matter of procedure in presentation of
proofs. But this may be quite vital as in any argumentation or debate as to what is
essential in proofs and how and when. The hearing judge as chancellor has great
control but the higher court has established a rule that proponent may offer the

record of probate and is entitled to rest. 14

187 108 Pa. 395 (1885) 1 A. 765.
138 208 Pa. 414 (1904) 67 A. 821.
189 See note 137, supra.
140 Palmer's Est.,
132 Pa. 297 (1890) 19 A. 137; Cf. Newhard v. Mundt, 152 Pa. 324 (1890)

19 A. 298.
lt& Ruddach v. Reichbach, 17, WNC 549 (1886) and article following report of this case by
Judge Allison. See also 20 PS 1961 supplement.
142 Geho's Est., 340 Pa. 412 (i941) 17 A. 2d. 342.
143 Szmahl's Est., 335 Pa. 89 (1939) 6 A. 2d. 267; Hile's Est., 310 Pa. 541 (1933) 166 A. 575,
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In Szmahl's Estatet " the Supreme Court through Stem, J. explained at length
and reaffirmed the established procedural principles that the proponents of a will
may offer the record of probate and rest. They may stand their ground despite any
ruling of the hearing judge 145 and if the contestants likewise rest without offering
evidence, proponents' case is established by the presumption. This applies to every
case. To dislodge the prima facie position of proponents, contestants must offer
some evidence. The judge as chancellor should then rule as to the effect of the evidence. The latter may be deemed insufficient or on the contrary it may be ruled that
the burden of going forward has shifted to the proponents. The burden of going
forward may thus shift back and forth during the hearing or the trial, but always
the burden of establishing the will is upon the proponents by a preponderance of
evidence. Likewise, contestants must present proofs by a preponderance in order to
overthrow the will. When at a hearing the evidence of both sides appears impressive enough to the chancellor to raise "a substantial dispute" a jury trial will be ordered. If contestants show a confidential relationship, the prima facie case is shaken
and proponents have the burden to explain the situation. In Caughey v. Briden.
baugh' 46 it was shown testatrix was an active, strong-minded woman, fully conversant with her affairs and obviously acting in the will making of her own volition. The
hearing judge refused an issue on appeal from probate and his action was sustained.
On the other hand, in Schwartz's Estate141 contestants showed a confidential relationship and weakness of bodi and mind and again the burden of going forward shifted
to proponent. With physical and mental condition involved, the rule of law becomes
more rigid and proponent had the burden of showing affirmatively that no improper
influence controlled testatrix and she had a clear knowledge of her property and
the effect of the testamentary disposition, which gave a considerable portion of
the estate to the confidant. The testimony, both lay and medical, was conflicting and
Judge Trimble dismissed an appeal from probate, refusing likewise to grant an
issue. This decree was affirmed. In Phillipsl4g Estate the procedure and result were
similar to that of Caughey v. Bridenbaugh, 1 9 Moschzisker, J., stressing that weakness of body and mind were essential elements in an attack 'on a will giving a substantial sum to a confidential advisor. In Gongaware v. Donehoo'50 the facts were
quite similar to those of Caughey v. Bridenbaugh'5 1 but the hearing judge granted
an issue resulting in a judgment for the contestants which was reversed by the
Supreme Court, stressing again the lack of any evidence showing weakness of body
and mind. In Liewellyn's Estate,152 another case of confidential relationship, the
decree of the lower court refusing an issue on appeal from probate, was affirmed,
144 See note 143, supra.

145 Plott's Est., 335 Pa. 81 (1939)

5 A. 2d. 901; Plege's Est., 340 Pa. 529 (1941)

17 A. 2d.

334; Geho's Est., 340 Pa. 412 (1941) 17 A. 2d. 344; See also chapter V ante, Record of Probate.
146 208 Pa. 414 (1904) 57 A. 821.
147 340 Pa. 170 (1940) 16A. 2d. 374. See notes 125 and 126, supra.
148 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457.

149 See note 146, supra.
1150255 Pa. 502 (1917) 100 A. 264.
151 See note 146, supra.

152 296 Pa. 74 (1929) 146 A. 810.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the facts being persuasive that the testator was fully master of his actions despite
a weakness of body, ravaged by a malignant disease, the mind appearing to be clear
and well poised. Furthermore, the will was prepared at the instance of the testator
and by a lawyer unknown to the confidant.
As a weak body and mind of testator shown inclines the court to increase the
weight of the burden for proponent to explain, conversely a strong body and mind
decreases the burden of proponents and increases the burden of the contestant. In
Plege's Estate'5" affirming the decree of the lower court which dismissed the appeal
of contestant from probate and refused an issue, Maxey, J., referring to Llewellyn's
Estate' 14 said:
"We then quoted with approval the following from Eble vs. Fidelity
T. & Tr. Co. et. al, 238, Pa. 585, 589, 86 A. 485, 486; 'When the charge
is that undue influence has been exerted on a strong and free mind, nothing short of direct, clear, and convincing proof of fraud or coercion will
avail. Logan's Estate, 195 Pa. 282, 45 A. 729. '"
It is further to be noted, bearing in mind the presumption and the shifting of
the burden of going forward in explanation, imposed on the confidant taking a
substantial share under the will of a testator weak in body and mind, particularly
when he procures the will to be written, that the gift may be defeated although
no specific facts of undue influence be shown as exerted at the time of execution. 155
This result magnifies the burden in confidant cases. But where confidential relationship is not present, to shift the burden to proponent, the contestant must show,
not only weakness of body and mind but in addition, as Kephart, J., pointed out
in Cookson's Estate,'56 there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial of improper
conduct sufficient to dominate or control testator's mind, the weakness merely showing the susceptibility of the testator's mind to outside influences.
Effect on Will,
In most cases of undue influence, the effect of a finding is to invalidate the
entire will, particularly where there is the element of testamentary incapacity for
weakness of mind. In Wagner's Estate'5 7 the facts found by the Orphans' Court
showed both lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. In disposing of the
contention of appellant that the will was effective except as to a provision giving
a bequest to the confidential advisor, Sadler, J. observed:
"It may be that some parts of a will can at times be sustained, though
others are void because of improper conduct shown to have been exercised
in securing their insertion. As was said by the court in Cuthbertson's App.,
97 Pa. 163, 173. 'There may be a case where the alleged undue influence is
applicable only to a single independent provision in a will, and that pro153 340 Pa. 529 (1941)

17A.2d. 334.
154 296 Pa. 74 (1929) 145 A. 810 Cf. Logan's Est., 195 Pa. 282 (1900) 45 A. 729, Stewart,
P.J. of lower court.
155 Schwartz's Est., 340 Pa. 170 (1940) 16 A. 2d. 374.
150 325 Pa. 81 (1937) 188 A. 904.
157 289 Pa. 361 (1927) 137 A. 616.
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vision may fail, leaving the rest of the will to stand. It is certainly not this
case, where the clause objected to is a residue, and that residue made up or
largely increased by alterations made, as a jury may conclude, under the
same influence for that purpose.' 'According to the authorities, undue influence may be exercised either through threats or fraud; but however
used, it must, in order to avoid a will, destroy the free agency of the testator at the time and in the very act of making the testament.': Trost v. Dingler, 118 Pa. 259, 269. The learned court below has found that Mrs. Wagner did not comprehend what she was doing when the will was signed,
and was without testamentary capacity."
In Carothers'Estate'58 Kephart, J. further explains as follows:
"Where a provision in a will which gives a legacy is void because of
undue influence, the will itself is not necessarily void nor are other legacies, unless such influence directly or impliedly affects them. Undue influence invalidates such part of a will as is affected by it. Ifthe whole will
is procured through undue influence, it is entirely void. Where, however,
part of a will is caused by undue influence, and the remainder is not affected by it, and the latter can be so separated as to leave it intelligible
and complete in itself, such part of the will is valid and enforceable. 1eage
on Wills, section 131; Wagner's Est., 289 Pa. 361, 368, 137 A. 616.
When a will contains distinct and independent provisions, so that different portions of the property or different estates or interests in the same
portions of the property are created, some of which are valid and others
invalid, the valid will be preserved- unless the provisions are so interdependent that they cannot be separated without defeating the general intent
of the testator. Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 190, 39 A. 879, 64 Am.
St. Rep. 621; 28 R. C. L. 358 and cases there cited. Bequests in a will,
otherwise valid, must be rejected when it is apparent that the disallowance
of invalid bequests causes the valid bequests to defeat the testator's wishes
as evidenced by the general scheme of his will, or if manifest injustice
would result to the beneficiaries. Johnston's Estate, supra. But such is not
the case here. The will is drawn in an orderly manner, each bequest is in a
separate and distinct paragraph, and no one part bears on another, so that
the will without the contested paragraphs, is in itself perfectly intelligible
and complete."
Fraud
In the definitions of undue influence fraud is included. In the definition given
in Phillips' Estate'69 it will be noted that this element is likewise embraced. A will
induced by force or fear may be said to be induced by fraud 6 0 and it would thus
come within the definition of Justice Storey that fraud consists of any cunning deception or artifice used to circumvent, cheat or deceive another.
In short, as pointed out by Roodiei it is a trick, secret device, false statement,
or pretense by which the subject of it is cheated. Again fraud is said to consist of
the unlawful obtaining of another's Rroperty by design, but without criminal intent,
and with the assent of the owner obtained by artifice or misrepresentation.
168 300 Pa. 185 (1930) 150 A. 585.
169 244 Pa. 35 (1914) 90 A. 457.
160 18 Ann. Cas. 412, Note.
161 Rood on Wills, 2d. Edition, Section 169.
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In the cases discussing the issue of undue influence matters involving the fraudulent conduct of a beneficiary may appear and in many of the cases fraud is dis1
cussed as being synonymous with undue influence. However, in Boyd v. Boyd, 62
Sharswood, J. very pertinently observed:
"Undue influence is very nearly allied to fraud, yet it may be true that
they are not identical, so that while undue influence comprehends fraud
-fraud by no means embraces every species of undue influence: Redfield
on Wills, 510, n. A person, for a very disinterested purpose, and because
he sincerely believes that it is the duty of a testator to make a will of a particular character, may carry his persuasion and influence beyond that point
which is legitimate. Yet it would hardly deserve so harsh a name as fraud.
But where the end and purpose of the influence is the benefit of the part,
employing it, it is not easy to distinguish and save it from the imputation.
Whereas undue influence has been defined to be a subtle species of fraud,
whereby mastery is obtained over the mind of the victim by insiduous approaches,
seductive artifices or other species of circumvention, yet cases generally hold that
undue influence is not the same thing as fraud, for one may exist without the other.
It has also been observed that fraud is a distinct head of objection from that of
importunity and undue influence. Importunity and undue influence may be fraudulently exerted but they are not inseparably connected with fraud. 168
There are comparatively few cases in our reports where the issues of fraud and
undue influence are not so intertwined, likewise the issues of testamentary capacity
and undue influence, that it is difficult to eliminate the one from the other. However, there are a few cases where this segregation seems to be apparent.
Like undue influence, fraud may assume a great variety of forms. RoodB4
cites a number of instances from the English as well as our American reports. A
festator executes one will, which he is led to believe is another as a blind man
having one will read to him but another substituted for signing. A specific provision may be inserted fraudulently or testator is induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to either make a certain will or modify the terms of one already made.
In Dietrick v. Dietrick'66 there was a feigned issue to try the validity of a will,
the contestants alleging fraud and imposition practiced upon the testator by the
principal devisee. It was charged that the displeasure of the testator was aroused
against his son whom he almost entirely disinherited by being told about the supposed extravagance of the son's wife and that she was dissipated and of loose character. At the trial evidence was offered of the general good character and conduct of
the wife, for the purpose of showing the falsity of the representations. The offer
was rejected and the jury found for the will. The judgment was reversed and a new
trial ordered, Gibson, J. holding that the evidence should have been admitted.
162 66 Pa. 283 (1870).
168 Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa. 46 (1862); Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 368 (1870); Herster v.
Herster, 122 Pa. 239 (1888) 28 A.L.R. 787, note; Robinson v. Robinson, 203 Pa. 400 (1902);
18 Ann. Cas. 412, note.
164 Rood on Wills, sub nomine.
165 5 S. & R. 207 (1819).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

In Nussear v. Arnoldl6 there was an issue to determine the validity of a will
and contestants were permitted to show that certain women had combined to impose
on the testator, after he had lost the use of his rational faculties, by keeping him
in a state of intoxication and that they represented themselves as persons of virtue
and good character and urged him to make a will in their favor to the exclusion of
his blood relations. It was held that the contestant could properly show that the
persons were women of bad character. Said Tilgham, C.J.:
"If the women were really of ood character they had a right to represent themselves as such, but if being of bad character they made the testator believe they were good,
it was a circumstance of fraud very proper to
167
be laid before the jury."
Stirk's Estate' 68
This is a unique case of constructive fraud perpetuated upon the will-maker
under the following circumstances. The testatrix executed a will by which her
residuary estate amounting to $340,000, was given to charity. Immediately follo,ing the execution of this will a codicil was added setting forth that as a question
of the legality of the bequest to the charity might arise if the testatrix died within
thirty days from the date of her will, she consequently revoked the gift to the charity and gave the residuary estate to a trust company whose agent had drawn the will
and the codicil. The testatrix did die within the period and the trust company
claimed the $340,000, and the question arose on exceptions to the adjudication of
the account. It appeared that the trust company was a stranger to the testatrix and
that she was not a stockholder nor a depositor and that the will and codicil were
prepared by an assistant trust officer of the company. When the codicil was pre.
pared with the name of the residuary legatee left blank, the scrivener asked the
testatrix to whom she wished her residuary estate to go in case of herudeath within
thirty days and she said "Give that to the company," naming the trust company. It
was held that the situation as presented was so extraordinary that both the testatrix and the scrivener must have intended, without openly stating it, that the gift
to the trust company was simply to meet the requirements of the law and to carry
the bequest to the charities as designated in the will. Furthermore, the action of the
scrivener constituted a constructive fraud which would prevent the trust company
from reaping a benefit from it, although the company did not in any way participate
in the fraud. Said Stewart, J.:
"Upon a review of all the testimony, and having in mind the situation
and surroundings of the testatrix, the character of the gift to the trust company, which if absolute, in the language of the learned auditing judge, is
incomprehensible and almost incredible,' we are constrained to the conclusion that it was the understanding of both the testatrix and Mr. Simp166 13 A. & R. 323 (1825).
167 See McShan v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 388 Pa. 113 (1940) 12 A. 2d. 59, for application of rule of evidence that declarations of one devisee cannot be admitted as against the interest
of another devisee, concerning testamentary capacity of testator.
168 232 Pa. 98 (1911) 81 A. 187.
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ler, notwithstanding that neither communicated in words such understanding to the other, that the bequest to the Land Title &Trust Company,
though by its terms absolute, was with the purpose to secure to the charities
designated in the will the bequests therein given them, in any and every
event; and that nothing more was intended than that the trust company
should be a medium of transmission. It follows that it is as though the
bequests were given directly to the charities, and the testatrix having died
within thirty days from the execution of the will, the bequest falls and so
much of the estate is to be distributed under the interstate laws of the state.
"We are quite aware that the case upon its facts is without exact parallel; nevertheless, its main and essential features bring it within the operation of established and familiar principles, and these we have applied.
With the statute out of the way we would hold without question that the
absolute bequest to the trust company was impressed with a trust for the
charities. For the reasons given the decree in this case awarding the fund
to the Land Title & Trust'Company is reversed, and the record is remitted
for distribution of that fund in accordance with the views here expressed."
Hoffner'.r Estate.1 69
This case presents another application of the constructive fraud doctrine with
rather peculiar facts wherein a parol promise was made in 1883 to a testatrix by a
beneficiary that the latter at her death would leave a certain sum of money to a
charity. In the will of the beneficiary the gift was made pursuant to the promise
but as the will was executed two days before the death of the testatrix, the application of the charities provision in the Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 332, came into
question. However, it was held that a gift to a religious use made in a will executed
within thirty days of the testatrix's death will be sustained, where it appears that
the gift was made in pursuance of a promise given to one who bequeathed her whole
estate to testatrix on the express understanding that such a gift should be made. It
was observed by Dean, J. that the money goes to the church not by will but because
there was no valid will when there ought to have been one, and that the right of
the church for whose benefit the promise was made to insist on the fulfilment of
the obligation in a court of equity in whose hands is the fund and before whom
are all parties in interest: Mitchell, J. in a dissenting opinion made the following
caustic observation:
"I do not understand that equity, even under the benign administration
of the longest footed chancellor, undertakes to enforce moral obligations
in the length and breadth of the Golden Rule, and it is important that we
should keep its boundaries carefully marked. The bequest of Prudence
Hoffner to the church was either a voluntary gift, or the performance of
a legal obligation. It was put in the form of gift, and in that form it was
peremptorily made void by statute. If it was to be enforced as an obligation, the church should be required to fill its bill, prove the consideration,
the contract or trust, and the failure to perform, as in other cases. Then we
should have the case freed from the confusion of moral and legal obligations, and without the danger of sanctioning a Violation of the statute
under the guise of enforcing a duty."
169 161 P. 331 (1894) 29A. 33.
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In Hollis v. Hollis1' 0 Endlich, J. sets forth the equity rule as applied in Hoffner's Estate,supra, as follows:
"A trust orally annexed by a testator to a bequest or devise absolute in
form, and accepted by the legatee or devisee at the time when the provision was made (or by his assent given prior to and continuing at that
time) either expressly or by words or acts of encouragement, or by silent
acquiescense, may be enforced in equity, because a refusal to perform the
trust under such circumstances is a fraud. The doctrine and its limitations,
firmly settled in the jurisprudence of this State, are illustrated by a uniform line of decisions, as the principal ones among which may be cited
Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts 162; Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496; Irwin v. Irwin,
34 Pa. 525; Church"& Wife v. Ruland & Wife, 64 Pa. 432; Schultz's
App., 80 Pa. 396; Brooke's App., 109 Pa. 188; Hodnett's Est., 154 Pa.
485; Hoffner's Est., 161 Pa. 331; McAuley's Est., 184 Pa. 124; McCloskey v. McCloskey, 205 Pa. 491; Washington's Est., 220 Pa. 204; Flood v.
Ryan, 220 Pa. 450; Blick v. Cockins, 234 Pa. 261."
As pointed out by Stewart, J., in Stirk's Estate' the trust doctrine will not be
applied directly in the fact of the charities restriction in the Act of 185 5172 although
the application was made indirectly in Hoffner's Estate178 Another refinement permitting evasion of the Act occurs in Floodv. Ryan 174 and Bickley's Estate', 6 where
the gifts were made absolutely to ecclesiastics without any promise exacted by testator
who apparently relied upon the donees to consider themselves as bound in the
"realm of conscience". This phase of the trust doctrine will be discussed in the next
chapter under the charities provision of Section 6 of the Wills Act of 1917.176
17
Carson's Estate.'
Assuming that fraud was committed by one beneficiary under a will does it
follow that the rule is applied that no person can claim an interest under a fraud
committed by another on the theory that however innocent the party may be, if the
original transaction is tainted with fraud that taint runs through the derivative

170 243 Pa. 90 (1916) 98 A. 789. Cf. Rock's vs. Sheppard, 302 Pa. 46 (1930) 152 A. 754;
Tuttle's Estate, 132 Pa. Super. Ct. 356 (1938) 200 A. 921; for rule that to establish a trust the
evidence must be clear, explicit and unequivocal. Owner of personal property may impose upon it
a valid trust, either by an explicit assertion or by a transfer' of the legal title to a third party upon
certain specific trusts and no fixed form of declaration is required to create a trust, but sufficient
facts must be averred to show the intention was plainly manifest. O'Connor v.Flick, 274 Pa. 521
(1922) 118 A. 431.
171 See note 168, supra.
172 April 26, 1855, P.L. 328; Sec. 6; Wills Act, June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, as amended, see 20
'PS 195 Supplement. See Also Sec. 7 (1) Wills Act of 1947. Report of Joint State Governmet
Commission, page 41.
178 161 Pa. 331 (1894) 29 A. 33.
174 220 Pa. 450 (1908)
175 270 Pa. 101 (1921)

69 A. 908.

113 A. 68 per Simpson, J., giving cogent reasons why the decisions are
unsound but yielding to stare decisis.
176 See note 172, supra.
M'"184 Cal. 427 (1920) 194 Pac. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239; Cases on Wills and Administration, Mechem
and Atkinson (1928) page 47.
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interest and prevents any party claiming under it?s78 Or may the interest of the
fraudulent beneficiary be segregated so that the instrument would be valid as to the
innocent parties but invalid as to the guilty parties? Although this question does
not appear to have been litigated in Pennsylvania, it has been answered in other
jurisdictions and notably in California where the topical case arose, affording another interesting slant'to the fraud phase in testamentary dispositions. Testatrix
gave bequests to various relatives aggregating some $35,000, and the residue over
$100,000 in value to "my husband, J. Gamble Carson." After probate a contest by
relatives was started, the charges being: (1) want of due execution, (2) undue
influence, (3) fraud upon testatrix practiced by Carson. The first ground was
abandoned and the substance of the other two was that, while Carson had gone
through a marriage ceremony with testatrix a year before her death, and she believed then and always thereafter that he was her husband, and made her will in
that belief, yet he was not legally her husband because he was already married and
had never been divorced from the wife who was still living. It was alleged also
that Carson knew he was not free to marry and yet represented that he was, and
that testatrix's belief was induced by these false representations and that solely
because of this belief she made the will leaving the bulk of her estate to him. The
lower court nonsuited contestants but on appeal this judgment was reversed and
the case sent back for a jury trial on the question, "Was the bequest in fact the fruit
of the fraud?" This, so said the court, was question for a jury to determine and
unless it can be said that the jury could have reasonably reached but one conclusion
concerning it, and that was that the bequest to Carson was not the direct fruit of
his fraud, the evidence was sufficient to prevent a nonsuit. Olney, J., thus reasoned:
"Now a case can be imagined where, nothing more appearing, as in
this case, than that the testatrix had been deceived into a void marriage
and had never been undeceived, it might fairly be said that a conclusion
that such deceit had affected a bequest to the supposed husband would not
be warranted. If, for example, the parties had lived happily together for
twenty years, it would be difficult to say that the wife's bequest to her
supposed husband was founded on her supposed relation with him, and
not primarily on their long and intimate association. It might well be that
if undeceived at the end of that time her feeling would be, not one of resentment at the fraud upon her, but of thankfulness that she had been
deceived into so many years of happiness. But, on the other hand, a case
can easily be imagined where the reverse would be true. If in this case
the will ad been made immediately after marriage, and the testatrix had
died within a few days, the conclusion would be well-nigh irresistible,
in the absence of some peculiar circumstances, that the will was founded
on the supposed legal relation into which the testatrix had been deceived
into believing she was entering. Between these two extreme cases come
those wherein it cannot be said that either one conclusion or the other is
wholly unreasonable, and in those cases the determination of the fact is
for the jury. Of that sort is the present."
17

Stirk's Est., supra, note 168; Bickley's Est., supra, note 175; O'Connor v. 0 Connor, 291
139 A. 734; Cameron v. Trust Co., 292 Pa. 121 (1928); 140 A. 768; A.L.R. 1;

Pa. 185 (1927)
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The court further held on the question of the entire will being affected or
failing, that this would not be so, Carson alone being charged with fraud. On this
feature the learned justice declared:
"So far as the other beneficiaries are concerned, their situation is that
the testatrix died leaving behind her a duly executed instrument, expressing her testamentary wishes in their favor unaffected by undue influence,
fraud, or other vitiating circumstance. This means nothing more or less
than that the will is perfectly valid as to them. The result is that it is only
the portions of the will in favor of Carson whose probate should be revoked in case the contestants should succeed, the remaining portions continuing as a valid expression of the testatrix's testamentary intention. 1
Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators, sec. 248; 14 Cyc. 1149;
sec. 1272, Civ. Code. If it were not possible to separate the portions affected by the fraud from those unaffected, it may be that the whole will
would have to fail, but that question is not presented here. for the provisions in favor of Carson are easily and completely separable from the
remainder. This being the situation, it is apparent that the beneficiaries,
other than Carson, are not affccted
by the contest, however it may go, and
'1 9
are not interested parties to it.7
Culbertson's Estate180
In the cases discussed so far the fraud has been perpetrated on the testator.
In the present case, however, the fraud was upon the register of wills presenting
to him for probate a forged will and imposing upon him by false testimony. This
case will be examined more in detail, post, in the Chapter on Probate, but suffice
it to remark here that the will as probated was set aside after twelve years upon
the prompt action of the parties when the fraud was discovered, the rights of
grantees and mortgagees dealing bona fide with the devisee being prctected.181
28 R.C.L. 139; 18 Ann. Cas. 412. Cf. Wagner's Est., 289 Pa. 361 (1927)

137 A. 616; Carothers'

Est.,
300 Pa. 185 (1930) 150 A. 585, remarks of Kephart.
179 See note 178, supra; 28 R.C.L. 139; 28 A.L.R. 787; 28 A.L.R. 1; 18 Ann. Cas. 412; 5

L.R.A. 340.

180 301 Pa. 438 (1930)

152 A 540; see also Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545, 16 A. 598, 10 Am.

St. Rep. 549.

181 For a curious and interesting series of cases showing fraud perpetrated, as contended, by the

testator, see O'Connor's Estate, 273 Pa. 391 (1922)
(1924)

117 A. 61; Leahey v. O'Connor, 281 Pa. 488

127 A. 65; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 291 Pa. 175 (1927)

139 A. 734.

